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Abstract  
 
Hurricane Florence made landfall near Wrightsville Beach, North Carolina in the 
morning of September 14th, 2018. The storm hovered over the Carolinas for the next three 
days, dropping nearly three feet of rain, which caused devastating and deadly flooding in the 
region. It is estimated that only about 15% of the losses caused by the hurricane in North 
Carolina will be covered by insurance due to the exclusion of flood damage from most 
homeowners policies. Florence brought national attention to the underinsurance of flood risk 
not only in North Carolina, but across the United States. The National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP) has been the primary provider of flood insurance in the United States since 
its inception in 1968 with upwards of 5 million contracts currently in force. The private 
market has been continually involved in flood insurance through the administration of NFIP 
policies but had shown no interest in assuming the underlying flood risk until recent years. 
With the NFIP up for reauthorization in May 2019 and the desire of private insurers to 
acquire flood risk, the United States flood insurance market is facing what could be drastic 
changes. However, the NFIP is not likely to disappear, and there are still numerous 
challenges private insurers have to overcome in order to gain market share. While the 
interaction between private and public sectors in the emerging flood market is uncertain, one 
thing is known for sure: in order for progress to be made, the underlying issue of 
underinsurance must be addressed which will require the discussion around flood insurance 
to change. 
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1 Hurricane Florence 
     1.1 The Storm 
Hurricane Florence originated from a strong tropical wave off the coast of Africa on 
August 30th, 2018, and, over the next day, steadily evolved into a tropical depression near 
Cape Verde. As the storm continued to progress along a west-northwest trajectory, it rose to 
tropical storm strength on September 1st and continued to fluctuate in strength over the next 
few days. Florence gained national attention on September 5th, when unexpected 
intensification culminated in the storm becoming a Category 4 hurricane. The storm’s 
intensity continued to vary over the next few days as it moved towards the Carolina 
coast.  As the threat of a major impact became apparent, the governors of North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, and Maryland, and the mayor of Washington D.C. 
declared a state of emergency, and on September 10th and 11th, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Virginia issued mandatory evacuation orders to many coastal communities. 
Florence made landfall on September 14th just south of Wrightsville Beach, NC as a 
Category 1 hurricane with sustained winds of 90 miles per hour (National Weather Service, 
2018). Florence continued to move west across the Carolinas, before advancing north 
through Virginia and finally downgrading to a post-tropical cyclone over West Virginia on 
September 17th and dispersing into another frontal storm two days later.  
     1.2 The Impact 
Although Florence had enough wind speed to uproot trees, cause widespread power 
outages, and spawn multiple tornados, most of the destruction was a result of the massive 
amounts of rain the hurricane brought. Florence became the wettest tropical cyclone recorded 
in North Carolina history with rain in excess of 30 inches recorded in multiple NC towns; 
post-storm rain totals across the Southeast can be seen in Figure 1 (Armstrong, 2019). Over 
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2,200 primary and secondary roads in North Carolina were closed due to flooding including 
large sections of major interstates. The city of Wilmington became completely isolated 
during the height of the storm as all roads to the city flooded and were deemed impassable. 
Florence resulted in a total of 53 fatalities across three states: 41 in NC, 10 in SC, and 2 in 
VA (Paul et al., 2019). In North Carolina alone 5,214 people were rescued from flooding, an 
estimated 74,563 structures were flooded, and nearly 140,000 citizens registered for disaster 
assistance (Armstrong, 2019). The United States Geological Survey published that nine 
different river gauges across North Carolina reported floods exceeding their 1-in-500 year 
expectations (Armstrong, 2019). 
 This extreme weather led to economic losses across the region as well. As of 
September 25th, State Farm, the largest property insurer in both North and South Carolina, 
had received approximately 2,840 auto claims and approximately 16,800 homeowner claims 
across the two states (O’Connor, 2018). Hurricane Florence hit NC during harvest time for 
many of the state’s major crops resulting in losses exceeding $1.1 billion from damage to 
crops and livestock (Karst, 2018). On October 31st, Governor Roy Cooper’s office issued a 
total damage estimate for North Carolina of nearly $17 billion (Insurance Journal 2018). 
However, losses to insurers were tempered due to the nature of the storm being a rain rather 
than wind event. Flood damage is an exclusion in most insurance policies, so while total 
losses in NC soared, estimates from modeling companies AIR Worldwide and Karen Clark & 
Co. place the insured losses from the storm in the $1.7 to $4.6 billion range (O’Connor, 
2018). The damage from just one inch of floodwater in an average home amounts to around 
$20,000, meaning that flood damage can have major financial implications for uninsured 
homeowners (Williams, n.d.). Those who suffered losses and lack flood insurance coverage 
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can apply for Federal Emergency Aid, however assistance is not available after every storm 
and can take months or even years to reach victims and often poorly matches needs (Kousky, 
Kunreuther, Lingle, & Shabman, 2018). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Flood Risk 
     2.1 Underinsurance of Flood Risk in the United States 
The $12 billion plus difference between total and insured losses from Hurricane 
Florence exposes the extent to which flood risk is underinsured in North Carolina. However, 
this issue extends across the United States; looking back at the 2017 hurricane season, 
Harvey, Irma, and Maria had a combined total cost of damage of $217 billion with only $92 
billion being covered by insurance realizing a $125 billion insurance gap (Lloyd’s, 2019). 
The underinsurance of flood risk has severe financial implications for individuals as well as 
communities. Lloyd’s city risk index lists flooding as contributing $12.55 billion to the 
Figure 1 (National Weather Service, 2018) 
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United States’ GDP at risk and $42.91 billion of the global GDP at risk (Lloyd’s 2018). 
Flood insurance provides the necessary financial assistance to cover the cost of repair and 
rebuilding; the department of Housing and Urban Development found that insured 
households were 37% more likely to have rebuilt their homes after Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita (Kousky et al., 2018). Flood insurance is a necessary product to limit the local and 
global impact of severe flooding events and to ensure the resilience of impacted 
communities. Despite the known benefits of insurance, the flood insurance gap continues to 
persist throughout the United States. 
     2.2 Brief History of Flood Coverage 
 The concept of adverse selection is what ultimately led private insurers to withdraw 
from the flood insurance market. Private insurers offered this coverage from about 1895 to 
1927, but only customers in areas prone to flooding were purchasing it (National Resource 
Council, 2015). Even with effective underwriting, insurers still had to charge an affordable 
premium which ultimately led to more claims being paid out than premiums brought in. 
Losses caused by the 1927 Mississippi River Floods as well as additional 1928 losses 
resulted in insurers terminating their flood coverages and withdrawing from the market 
(National Resource Council, 2015). Flood risk is not covered by the private insurance market 
simply because they found it to be an unprofitable product. 
3 The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) 
     3.1 History 
 The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was created in response to 
the withdrawal of private insurers from the flood insurance market. Without flood insurance 
to cover a portion of the losses, the federal government was increasingly asked to provide 
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disaster relief after flooding events. It was President Truman who first proposed the request 
to congress to “establish a national system of flood disaster insurance” in 1951 (National 
Resource Council, 2015). After a series of severe loss events in the 60s, President Johnson 
created a task force who wrote a report titled A Unified National Program for Managing 
Flood Losses; this report, along with congressional testimony from the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was the origin of the original NFIP legislation 
(National Resource Council, 2015). The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 created the 
National Flood Insurance Program to be administered by HUD, and although it has been 
modified many times, the act is still the legislative foundation of the NFIP. When created, the 
National Flood Insurance program had two main objectives: to encourage state and local 
governments to constrict the development of land exposed to flood hazards, and to provide 
flood insurance through a cooperative cost sharing program between public and private 
sectors. However, within a decade, the sharing program had been abandoned, and the NFIP 
took full responsibility of rate setting and risk bearing (National Resource Council, 2015). 
The 2012 reauthorization of the National Flood insurance program included provisions aimed 
at encouraging private flood insurance; legislation passed the house in the 114th congress but 
was not taken up by the Senate before the end of the Congress (Horn & Webel, 2018). 
Therefore, most flood insurance coverage in the United States is still through the NFIP.   
In the past 10 years, there have been various pieces of legislation passed that 
significantly impact the National Flood Insurance Program. The Biggert-Waters Flood 
Insurance Reform Act of 2012 was passed to address the fiscal insolvency of the NFIP by 
funding the national mapping program and allowing certain rate increases to transition the 
program from subsidized to full actuarial rates reflective of true risk (FEMA, 2018c). In 
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2014, the Consolidated Appropriations Act prohibited the implementation of certain parts of 
Biggert-Waters, effectively stopping certain rate increases, while new law was developed to 
address concerns related to raising rates (FEMA, 2018c). As a result, the Homeowner Flood 
Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 repealed certain parts of Biggert-Waters, restored 
grandfathering (allowing low rates remain even if risk is found to be higher), put limits on 
rate increases, and updated the approach to ensure fiscal soundness by applying a surcharge 
to all policyholders ($25 for a primary residence and $250 for all others) (FEMA, 2018c). 
     3.2 Current Program Status 
The National Flood Insurance Program is currently managed by the Federal 
Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), and is the primary provider of flood 
insurance coverage in the U.S. The NFIP provides nearly $1.28 trillion in coverage for over 5 
million residential policies, $66 billion in coverage for non-residential properties, and 
collects about $3.5 million in annual premiums (Horn & Webel, 2018). Over its lifetime, the 
NFIP has evolved to have three main objectives: to provide flood insurance, to improve 
floodplain management, and to develop maps of flood hazard zones. While their results from 
selling insurance are easily measured in their financial outcome, the impacts of their other 
functions are harder to measure and see. The NFIP operates so that in years of multiple 
catastrophic disasters they are able to borrow from the Treasury to cover the gap between 
claims paid and premiums collected. However, over time the NFIP’s debts have increased 
sharply, and with projected total claims of $9.7 billion for the 2017 hurricane season, 
Congress had to cancel $16 billion of NFIP debt in order for the program to pay its claims; 
thus making the cancelled debt a non-transparent, liability for general taxpayers, and as such 
a subsidy (Horn & Webel, 2018). The NFIP is currently operating on short-term 
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reauthorization until May 31st, 2019 (FEMA, 2018a). A bill for long term reauthorization 
(H.R. 2874) passed the House in November 2017, however three bills (S. 1313, S. 1368, S. 
1571) have been introduced to the Senate but none have been acted on by the full senate 
(Horn & Webel, 2018). All four of these bills contain various provisions to support the 
emergence of private flood insurance. 
According to FEMA, the NFIP is currently focused on “implementing recent law by 
adjusting premium increases, issuing new rates and map updates, supporting mitigation and 
ensuring advocacy to connect policyholders with the information they need to better 
understand the program” (FEMA, 2018c).  
     3.3 Coverage and Rating 
Flood coverage through the NFIP is available to anyone in a participating community, 
and purchase is generally voluntary except for those in Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHA). 
In order to be eligible to participate, communities must adopt specific land use and building 
code standards. Coverage limits are relatively low, notably for non-residential properties or 
properties in high-cost areas and can be seen outlined in detail in Table 1. There is a 
mandatory purchase requirement that dictates property owners within SFHAs purchase 
coverage as a condition for any mortgage made, guaranteed, or purchased by any federal 
agency, federally regulated lending institution, or government sponsored enterprise (Horn & 
Webel, 2018). To comply with this mandate, coverage must be purchased through the NFIP 
or private insurer coverage must be at least as broad as the coverage of the NFIP. This 
mandatory purchase requirement is not enforced by FEMA but rather by lenders, and lenders 
can be fined up to $2,000 for each instance of noncompliance (Horn & Webel, 2018).  
Additionally, property owners who do not obtain insurance when required are not eligible for 
9 
 
certain types of disaster relief after a flood. Beyond this legal requirement, some lenders are 
requiring borrowers outside of SFHAs to purchase flood insurance as well in order to 
financially secure the property.  
Once a community joins the National Flood Insurance Program, a study is completed 
to issue a Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM) that is based on the community’s flood risk and 
outlines the special hazard areas and other applicable risk premium zones. An example of a 
FIRM can be seen in Figure 2, and additional information about FIRM maps and flood 
hazard zone ratings can be found in Appendix A. The NFIP rates policies in different ways 
dependent upon whether a FIRM has been issued for the community. All buildings 
constructed after a FIRM has been issued are charged full-risk, actuarially fair premiums that 
include the full range of loss potential including catastrophic losses; if the new constructions 
are in compliance with floodplain management ordinances, the premium should be 
reasonable and affordable (Hayes & Neal, 2012). Additionally, this enhances the NFIP goal 
of discouraging building in areas known to have a high flood risk because the full-risk 
premiums for coverage would be unaffordable. In addition to new constructions, all buildings 
found to be outside of Special Flood Hazard Areas are charged full-risk premiums since the 
risk is low the premiums are low as well (Hayes & Neal, 2012). Buildings in SFHAs that 
were constructed before the development of the FIRM are charged discounted, or subsidized, 
premiums, since their full-risk premiums would be extremely high (Hayes & Neal, 2012). It 
is notable that the NFIP is not provided funds to offset the subsidized and discounted 
premiums which has contributed to their need to borrow from the U.S. Treasury to pay NFIP 
Claims (Horn & Webel, 2018).   
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The justification for subsidized premiums aligns closely with the goals of the NFIP. 
Lowering premiums for existing structures made it easier for communities to join the NFIP 
thereby increasing the number of communities with sound floodplain management and 
reducing the nation’s flood risk exposure. Reasonable premiums also increase the likelihood 
that a property owner purchases insurance and at least partially fund their own recovery from 
flood damage which is preferable to disaster relief coming solely from taxpayer funding. Too 
high premiums for flood insurance could also cause the abandonment of economically viable 
buildings which does not support the goals of the NFIP. An assessment by the NFIP found 
that if charged full-risk rates subsidized policies would pay on average two and a half times 
their current premium, and if the subsidy was eliminated and full-risk rates were charged for 
all NFIP policies, the aggregate premium for the program would increase between 50%-75% 
(Hayes & Neal, 2012). 
In addition to subsidized premiums, NFIP policyholders can receive reduced rates 
through the Community Rating System (CRS). The purpose of the CRS is to encourage 
floodplain management activities that exceed the NFIP minimum standards, and depending 
on the extent of participation, policyholder’s premiums can be reduced by as much as 45% 
(FEMA, 2018b). Beyond just the reduction in insurance premiums, FEMA claims that CRS 
floodplain management activities “enhance public safety, reduce damage to property and 
public infrastructure, avoid economic disruption and losses, reduce human suffering, and 
protect the environment” (FEMA, 2018b). Currently, nearly 3.6 million policyholders in 
1,444 communities participate in the community rating system; CRS communities represent 
only 5% of the 22,000 communities participating in the NFIP, but due to the increase in 
affordability that the CRS provides, 69% of all flood insurance policies are written in CRS 
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communities (FEMA, 2017). Communities are classified based on their participation in 19 
credible activities that fall into 4 categories: public information, mapping and regulations, 
flood damage reduction, and warning and response (FEMA, 2017) Communities also have 
access to technical assistance for designing and implementing some activities at no charge 
(FEMA, 2018b). Participation in this program provides communities an additional incentive 
to improve and maintain their floodplain management program and can even get them to 
qualify for other federal assistance programs (FEMA, 2018b). The community rating system 
is a way for the NFIP to offer direct premium reductions on policies where there is an active 
effort to reduce risk exposure. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 (Horn & Webel, 2018) 
Figure 2 (FEMA, 2018d) 
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     3.4 Private Market Involvement 
Although private insurers have taken on minimal flood risk since initially 
withdrawing from the market, they have been involved with the National Flood Insurance 
Program through both the administration of policies and reinsurance.  
          3.4.1 Administration of Policies 
The main way in which the private market is directly involved with the NFIP is 
through the administration of policies. While FEMA provides management to the NFIP and 
is ultimately the risk bearer, the day-to-day operations of the NFIP are handled by private 
companies. This includes all aspects of the insurance process including marketing, selling 
and writing policies, and all aspects of the claim process. There are two types of 
arrangements that the NFIP has with private insurers, and in both, the NFIP retains the 
financial risk of paying the claims and the policy terms and premiums are the same. The first 
is the Direct Servicing Agent (DSA) in which the private insurer acts as a private contractor 
selling NFIP policies on behalf of FEMA to individuals seeking to purchase coverage 
directly from the NFIP (Horn & Webel, 2018).  
The second arrangement is the Write-Your-Own (WYO) program. Through this 
program, companies are paid to write and service the standard NFIP flood insurance policies 
in their own name. The WYO program has three main goals: increase the NFIP policy base 
and geographic distribution, improve service to NFIP policyholders, and to provide the 
insurance industry with direct operating experience with flood insurance (FEMA, 2019c). 
About 12% of the NFIP policy portfolio is managed through the DSA program with the 
remaining 88% administered through the 60 companies participating in the WYO program 
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(FEMA, 2019c) (Horn & Webel, 2018). The companies participating in the WYO program as 
of August 2018 can be found in Appendix B. 
          3.4.2 Reinsurance 
 The 2014 Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act enabled the private market 
to begin bearing a portion of the NFIP flood risk by giving FEMA the authority to secure 
reinsurance for the NFIP from private reinsures as well as the capital market (Horn & Webel, 
2018). There were a few motives for implementing this change, the most notable being that it 
reduces the chance that FEMA will need to borrow from the treasury to pay claims. 
Additionally, it allows FEMA to price policies more efficiently because they can factor what 
they are paying in reinsurance premiums into their own pricing model. The main benefit of 
reinsurance, for the NFIP but also in general, is that it creates stability and reduces the 
volatility of losses over time especially when potentially extreme events are involved. For the 
past three years, FEMA has purchased reinsurance to cover losses from individual flood 
events, as opposed to aggregate losses, and the structure of these various reinsurance 
agreements can be seen in Figure 3. FEMA contracted with Guy Carpenter and Company, a 
subsidiary of Marsh & McLennan Companies to provide broker services to secure 
reinsurance placement, and they contracted with Aon for financial advisory throughout the 
reinsurance process (FEMA, 2019a). The 2019 agreement for $1.32 billion in reinsurance 
coverage is composed of contracts with 28 private reinsurers who can be found listed in 
Appendix C. In August 2018, FEMA transferred additional NFIP risk to private markets by 
securing $500 million of reinsurance from the capital markets through the issuance of the 
FloodSmart Re. catastrophe bond (Artemis, 2018). The transaction was facilitated with 
assistance from Hannover Re through the Hannover Re Designated Activity Company and is 
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backed by more than 35 insurance-linked securities investors. It is designed as a three-year 
bond term running from August 1st, 2018 to July 31st, 2021 (Artemis, 2018). Three of the 
proposed bills currently in congress require or encourage the NFIP to continue to transfer risk 
to the private reinsurance market (Horn & Webel, 2018).  
 
 
 
4 Privatization of Flood Insurance 
     4.1 Current Private Market Flood Insurance 
 In addition to the NFIP, there are a few private companies that have started to break 
into the market in recent years and currently offer flood insurance coverage to consumers. 
Private company policies generally provide commercial coverage or coverage beyond the 
NFIP coverage limits. Additionally, the private market tends to focus on high-value 
properties which have higher premiums which therefore justify the extra expenses of flood 
underwriting (Horn & Webel, 2018). Private flood insurance has shown consistent growth 
Figure 3 (FEMA, 2019a) 
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over recent years but still only makes up 3-4% of the total market. Most private flood 
coverage is written by surplus lines carriers however some admitted carriers have begun to 
offer it has well. The most recent study regarding private flood insurance was conducted in 
2017 by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and results were 
published in June 2018. NAIC reported $630 million in private market flood premiums for 
2017, up from the $412 million written in 2016, but this is still a fraction of the NFIP 
premiums of $3.5 billion (Carrier Management, 2018). Commercial lines still represent the 
majority of business written, with approximately 64% of the market down from 66% in 2016. 
This is due to a $104 million increase in residential private flood coverage largely driven by 
Assurant’s entrance to the market and their $88.2 million written in new residential flood 
insurance (Carrier Management, 2018).  Other carriers that contributed to a significant 
portion of the 2017 market growth include ZurichRe, FM Global, Berkshire Hathaway, and 
Liberty Mutual (Carrier Management, 2018). The top 8 carriers of both private commercial 
and residential flood as well as their 2017 direct premiums written are outlined in Figures 4 
and 5 below. 
 
  
 Figure 4 (Carrier Management, 2018)
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     4.2 Issues and Barriers to Entry 
Private insurers have made clear their interest to enter more prominently into to the 
flood insurance market, however in order for them to do so, there are various obstacles and 
difficulties that they will have to overcome. Many relate to the NFIP and the federal 
regulation of flood insurance but overcoming the rating problem in order to make flood 
insurance a profitable operation is a concern as well.  
          4.2.1 Regulation 
Currently, the NFIP allows for flood insurance purchased under the mandatory 
purchase requirement to be purchased through a private insurer, given that the coverage is “at 
least as broad as” the coverage available through the NFIP (Horn & Webel, 2018). The 
difficulty in this is that no entity has been assigned the task of evaluating whether specific 
policies meet this standard, and the criteria to be used in this assessment remain undefined. 
Two of the proposed congressional bills include provisions to remove this language and 
instead allow for any private insurance that is in compliance with individual state laws and 
Figure 5 (Carrier Management, 2018) 
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regulations to be accepted in fulfilling the mandatory purchase requirement (Horn & Webel, 
2018).  
Another reason that private insurers continue to have limited involvement in 
assuming flood risk is due to the “non-compete” clause that previously existed in the 
standard contracts between the NFIP and Write Your Own (WYO) carriers (Horn & Webel, 
2018). This clause was recently amended for the 2019 fiscal year to allow WYO carriers to 
also offer their own flood coverage provided that they ensure it remains entirely separate 
from their NFIP WYO business. This includes ensuring that all communication regarding the 
private policies clearly indicates that it is not supported by the NFIP, FEMA, or the Federal 
Government in any way, and that all data related to the carrier’s arrangement with the NFIP 
not be used to support their non-NFIP flood insurance lines (FEMA, 2018e).  
Private insurers are also concerned about the uncertainty of state regulation as it 
relates to flood insurance. Most other insurance markets are regulated at the state level, so as 
private sector involvement in the flood market continues to grow, it is reasonable to assume 
that state regulator’s involvement in the flood market will grow as well. This will likely add 
complexity and additional costs to insurers, and the uncertainty surrounding it has 
contributed to the hesitation of private insurers to enter the market. Consumer protections 
will also vary if private policies are regulated at the state level. The language in private flood 
policies is not standardized and has not been tested in court in the same way as other 
coverages, such as homeowners, have been. Therefore, there may be a greater variability in 
the outcome of claims for insurers, as well as for consumers, in the early years of private 
flood insurance coverage. However, regulation at a state level could provide benefits to the 
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market as well through the development of state-specific insurance solutions that better suit 
local social and economic conditions (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015).  
          4.2.2 Rating 
 In the absence of any regulation that forces private coverage, the private insurance 
market only underwrites risks that can reasonably be expected to result in a profitable line of 
business. Shortcomings in adequate ratemaking are what made flood insurance unprofitable, 
leading to the initial withdrawal of insurers from this market. Proper ratemaking is easier said 
than done, and there are a number of challenges that private insurers will have to overcome 
before beginning to write profitable flood policies.  
               4.2.2.1 An Evolving Risk 
One reason that flood risk is especially difficult to cover is because it is a widespread 
and dynamic risk. The entire country is exposed to flood risk, and the flood risk in a 
particular location transitions over time, due to new development, changes in flood 
management infrastructure, and environmental changes.  
Flooding typically falls into one of three categories: coastal surge flood, fluvial, and 
pluvial. Coastal flood occurs in areas that lie on the coast of a large body of water and is the 
result of extreme tidal conditions caused by severe weather. Storm surge is the most common 
form of coastal flooding. It occurs when high winds from hurricanes and other storms push 
water onshore (Maddox, 2014). Fluvial, or riverine flooding, occurs when excessive rainfall 
over an extended period of time causes a river to exceed its capacity; it can also be caused by 
heavy snow melt and ice jams (Maddox, 2014). The damage from this type of flooding can 
be widespread as the overflow in one area affects smaller rivers downstream and can cause 
dams and dikes to break. According to FEMA, fluvial flooding is the most common type of 
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flood event (Maddox, 2014). The third type of flooding, pluvial or surface flooding, occurs 
when heavy rainfall creates a flooding event that is independent of an overflowing body of 
water, although it usually happens in conjunction with coastal or fluvial flooding (Maddox, 
2014). This type of flooding typically happens when drainage systems become overwhelmed 
or when land is so saturated it is unable to absorb runoff. None of these types of flooding are 
covered under typical homeowners or property insurance coverages but would be covered 
under a flood insurance policy.  
Exposure to all three types of flooding changes over time because of weather patterns, 
erosion, and new development. According to the 2017 Climate Science Special Report, many 
parts of the U.S. have experienced an increase in flooding over the last 50 years while others 
have experienced a decrease (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2018). Climate change is one of 
the biggest drivers currently altering flood risk around the world. Multiple studies have 
shown that extreme precipitation events have become more frequent and more intense in 
parts of the United States since the early 1990s; heavy rainfall events are one of the primary 
contributors to flooding, and the warming atmosphere is causing these events to occur more 
frequently (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2018). Trends regarding rain and flooding in the 
U.S. can be found illustrated in Figure 6. The US National Weather Service recorded 10 rare 
rain events that led to flooding between May 2015 and August 2016 even though similar 
events were projected to occur once every 500 years (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2018). 
An increase in the frequency and severity of high precipitation events increases the 
likelihood and impact of all 3 types of flooding.  
Land use changes including construction in floodplains, increased use of 
impermeable surfaces such as asphalt, the removal of wetlands and river bank vegetation, 
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deterioration of water-management infrastructure, and the building of dams, levees, or 
channels can alter the ability of land to accommodate heavy precipitation and can change the 
natural flow of rivers and streams which in turn increases the potential for flooding. A study 
of the Mississippi River found that the increase in flooding over the past 150 years cannot be 
explained by precipitation patterns alone and that river engineering and agricultural 
expansion are responsible for up to 75% of the increased flood risk (Union of Concerned 
Scientists, 2018). Additionally, an analysis of Harris County, Texas noted rapid suburban 
development as reducing the land’s natural drainage and contributing to increased flood risk 
during events such as Hurricane Harvey (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2018). The increase 
in wildfires from climate and land use changes also has an impact on flooding as less water is 
retained and erosion increases.  
The impact of flooding events is enhanced by the movement of people to hurricane 
and flood prone areas. Historically, people sought to settle near the coast and along 
waterways, and those settlements have continued to grow into towns and cities over time.  
From 1980 to 2017, there was an increase of 95 people per square mile, more than double, in 
counties along the U.S. shoreline that experienced hurricane-strength winds from Florence in 
September 2018 (Dapena, 2018). Overall, areas most vulnerable to hurricane strikes, namely 
counties along the Gulf and East coast, had an increase of 160 people per square mile, 
compared to an increase of 26 people per square mile in the mainland over the same period 
(Dapena, 2018). This increase in population and exposure in hurricane and flood prone areas 
is a significant driver of the increasing cost of storms and outlines yet another way that flood 
risk is changing. 
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                    4.2.2.1.1 A Case Study of North Carolina 
 
 In order to see the evolving nature of flood risk, we can take a closer look at North 
Carolina and the impact of Hurricanes Hazel and Florence on the state. These two storms 
lend themselves to a natural comparison because of their nearly identical landfall locations 
and paths across the state. Hurricane Hazel made landfall as a category 4 hurricane near 
Calabash, NC on October 15th, 1954 (Storm Events Database). Hurricane Florence made 
landfall as a category 1 hurricane near Wrightsville Beach, NC, about 50 miles northeast of 
Calabash, on September 14th, 2018 (Storm Events Database).  
 At the time of its occurrence, Hurricane Hazel was considered the most destructive 
hurricane to ever affect the state; coastal winds were estimated as high as 150 MPH and 
storm surge reached 12-18+ feet (Storm Events Database). The storm caused 19 fatalities in 
North Carolina, destroyed or damaged over 50,000 homes and caused $1.48 billion in total 
damage to the state (inflated to 2019 dollars) (“Storms to Life” Report, 2010). Current 
catastrophe models estimate that if Hurricane Hazel were to strike in October 2018, total 
damage would reach $4.7 billion. The $3.22 billion difference in damages between when the 
storm actually occurred and the losses if the same storm were to occur today, clearly shows 
Figure 6 (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2018) 
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the increase in financial impact that results from the continuing development and 
redistribution of land use in hurricane prone areas.  
 Hurricane Florence, although just a Category 1 storm at landfall, had an even greater 
impact on the state. With wind speeds near 90 MPH and storm surge of 10 feet, Florence 
resulted in 39 deaths in NC and caused a total of $23 billion in damage (“Storms to Life” 
Report, 2018). Although Hazel was a more powerful and intense storm, Florence had a 
bigger financial impact on the state. This is partly because Florence was more spread out and 
affected a larger portion of the state, but also because of the movement of the storms after 
landfall. Hazel continued to move at around 55 MPH, but Florence only traveled forward at a 
speed of around 5 MPH (Storm Events Database). Because Florence sat and hovered, the 
state was exposed to its destructive elements for a longer period of time which resulted in 
more damages. Additionally, Florence brought significantly more rain than did Hazel 
resulting in substantially more flooding in addition to wind damages.  
The difference in the nature of these storms explicitly demonstrates the evolution of 
catastrophic events over time due to climate change as well as other factors. On average, 
hurricanes in particular are becoming slower moving and wetter events therefore causing 
more damage from extreme flooding and storm duration. 
               4.2.2.2 FEMA Flood Maps and Data 
In addition to the evolving nature of flood risk causing rating difficulties, insurers 
currently do not have access to the information necessary to adequately evaluate flood risk 
across the United States which is an important aspect of the ratemaking process.  
FEMA produces the Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) that are used by the NFIP 
to rate their flood insurance policies, although the accuracy and usefulness of these maps 
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have been under scrutiny from the private insurance market. FIRM maps are used in over 
22,000 communities and FEMA has spent $200 million in recent years to update the maps 
(Adriano, 2018). However, a February 2018 publication by the Environmental Research 
Letters journal reported that more than 40 million Americans are exposed to high flood risk 
at the 100-year-flood or 1% level which is roughly three times more than the risk suggested 
by FEMA’s flood maps (Adriano, 2018). Even with FEMA’s recent spending on mapping 
updates, in 2017 only 42% of maps were up to date with some of those still in use dating as 
far back as the 1970s (Adriano, 2018). While FEMA attempts to keep track of land use and 
gradient changes through letters of map revisions, FEMA flood maps have been criticized for 
not considering the evolving nature of flood risk, most notably climate change, previously 
discussed.  
This does not necessarily mean that FEMA maps are without value. It is important to 
remember that these maps are created for purposes beyond just that of insurance pricing; they 
are also used in the development of zoning and land usage laws. Additionally, the maps were 
created specifically for the use by the NFIP in policy rating and the goals of the NFIP do not 
always align with the goals of private insurers; the NFIP is charged with making flood 
coverage available to those who need it at an affordable price while private insurers are 
focused on making a profit. Because of this discrepancy, the risk rating that FEMA gives a 
property may not always align with the risk rating that the private market would assign it. 
This means that although the FIRM maps are accurate and useful to FEMA and the NFIP, 
they are not sufficient for use by the private market to rate flood insurance policies. The 
private market will therefore have to develop their own flood risk evaluation tools and 
models for use in the policy rating process which will be discussed in section 4.2.3.1. 
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The private market needs an extensive amount of data regarding both past flooding 
events and resulting claims in order to develop these models as well as for use in other steps 
of the ratemaking process. Since flood insurance has not been offered by private companies 
for so long, they are facing a severe lack of this necessary data. NFIP data on flood losses 
and claims is currently unavailable to the private market. Increasing access to past NFIP data 
would allow insurers to better estimate future losses and price their premiums which 
ultimately will determine whether they are willing to enter the market and which properties 
they might be willing to insure. However, the Privacy Act of 1974 prohibits FEMA from 
releasing policy and claims information that contains personally identifiable information, so 
FEMA would have to address these privacy concerns in order to be able to provide property 
level information to insurers (Horn & Webel, 2018). The proposed congressional bills 
include terms on making claims data available: one would require FEMA to make all NFIP 
claims data publicly available in a form that conceals personal information, another would 
authorize FEMA to sell or license individual claims data while requiring aggregate claims 
data be made available (Horn & Webel, 2018).  
               4.2.2.3 The Subsidy Problem 
The subsidy problem is often seen as one of the largest barriers to private sector 
involvement in flood insurance. Law currently mandates that a portion of the cost of flood 
insurance for properties in high risk flood areas be subsidized. In order for private insurers to 
take on a risk, they must charge an “actuarially fair” rate that adequately reflects the risk that 
they are acquiring. Private insurers also require that their rates include a profitable return on 
capital as well; this means that even rates that are actuarially sound from an NFIP perspective 
may still be underpriced from the perspective of private insurers.   
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Should the NFIP continue to operate and private insurers enter the market as direct 
competitors, the private market will not be able to compete with the NFIP subsidized rates 
and will therefore be unable to write policies in those locations. With around 20% of NFIP 
policies receiving some sort of subsidy, there is a large portion of the market that is 
automatically unavailable for private insurers to access (FEMA, 2014). However, private 
companies have already found niches where they believe they will be able to underprice the 
NFIP. With the total extent of NFIP subsidization not historically tracked, it is difficult to 
quantify how NFIP and private insurance rates would compare. Milliman and KatRisk 
attempted to answer this question by looking at the premiums for single family homes in 
Louisiana, Texas, and Florida. Their modeling suggests that 77% of single-family homes in 
Florida, 69% in Louisiana, and 92% in Texas would pay less under a private policy than 
under the NFIP; however, 14% in Florida, 21% in Louisiana, and 5% in Texas would pay 
over twice as much (Horn & Webel, 2018). 
Through the Biggert Waters Flood insurance Reform Act of 2012 and the 
Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, FEMA is already actively working 
to reform their rating approach and move towards a more risk-based pricing structure, 
although they are still faced with restrictions placed on their annual premium rate increases. 
The move to risk-based pricing will encourage the growth of private insurer involvement in 
the primary flood insurance market because they will be able to compete with the NFIP in 
more areas. This move will lead to higher rates for households in flood prone areas which 
aligns with the NFIP goals of discouraging building in those places.  
An associated issue is that of continuous coverage. Under existing law, if an NFIP 
policyholder allows their policy to lapse, any subsidy that they received is eliminated 
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immediately. Unless legislation is changed to allow for private insurance to count as 
continuous coverage, policyholders may be reluctant to purchase private insurance if it meant 
that they would lose their subsidy should they ever decide to return to NFIP coverage. With 
NFIP subsidized rates increasing to better reflect risk, this barrier to entry may resolve on its 
own.  
               4.2.2.4 Rating Theories 
 Even with the other barriers to entry removed, there is still the need for private 
insurers to determine how they will rate their flood insurance policies. The NFIP relies on the 
FIRM flood maps produced by FEMA for ratemaking purposes. Since profit making is not 
part of the NFIP’s overall purpose, the maps they use for rating will not translate well to 
usage by private insurers for rating policies; additionally, it has been established that the 
NFIP rating structure would not be profitable since the NFIP is heavily in debt1; although, 
some of the debt is attributable to the subsidy problem previously discussed. Quantifying risk 
is the first step in the ratemaking process. Since insurers lack faith in FEMA’s maps to 
accurately do this, they first need to come up with an alternative method to evaluate flood 
risk which will be discussed in section 4.2.3 and the accompanying subsections. Once they 
are satisfied that have been able to properly assess a property’s flood risk, there are a few 
techniques that they have been proposed regarding how insurers could handle pricing flood 
insurance policies. 
                    4.2.2.4.1 Multi-Peril Ratemaking 
The first rating technique would prove useful if insurers were to offer flood coverage 
as a part of homeowner’s policies, and it involves including flooding as a peril in property 
                                                          
1 NFIP current debt is approximately $20.5 Billion after subtracting the $16 billion that was waived after 2017-
2018 storms, and $4.2 billion in interest has been paid since Hurricane Katrina in 2005. (FEMA, 2019b) 
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insurance multiperil ratemaking. Decomposing risks by peril is not a unique or new idea and 
is commonly used in homeowner’s insurance rating. Rating by peril is intuitively appealing 
because the predictors that are useful in predicting one peril may not predict well for others. 
Current multi-peril rating practice is based on modeling each peril in isolation of the others. 
However, the problem with rating in this way is that it assumes that the perils are 
independent although past studies have demonstrated statistically significant dependence 
among perils (Frees, Meyers, & Cummings, 2012). This can have major implications when 
discussing flood risk since floods often occur in conjunction with other perils: hurricanes 
bring flooding and wind, thunderstorms bear lightning and heavy rains. Including the 
relationships between perils in multi-peril models has the potential to allow insurers to more 
accurately model true risks and therefore develop adequate premiums that are reflective of 
that risk. It has been proposed to include the dependency of perils through the usage of 
copulas in a generalized linear model to create a multivariate framework for pricing (Yang & 
Shi, 2018). By using this framework on perils that are correlated, the information on one peril 
will aid in learning about the other perils. It is also important to include the dependence 
between risks in multi-peril models because risk dependence has important implications for 
risk aggregation and risk margin analysis (Yang & Shi, 2018). The availability of 
longitudinal data also makes this model for multi-peril rating appealing to insurers. 
Longitudinal data is repeated measures of the same subject; in this context, looking at past 
loss experience for a singular property. This not only allows insurers to incorporate 
experience rating through repeated observations but allows them to incorporate the claim 
history not only for the peril being priced but other correlated perils as well.  
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Although applying a multi-peril model to homeowners insurance is intuitively 
plausible, not all insurers will want to use this complex model. Pricing by peril requires more 
efforts on data collection and model building. In the end, customers are charged a single 
price for homeowners insurance meaning that decomposition by peril may not be necessary 
or worth the added cost. Additionally, like all complex models, there is the potential that 
models with extra parameters could lead to overfitting and overall poor prediction. In order 
to implement this multivariate framework for multi-peril models, extensive past loss data is 
necessary, and as previously discussed, there is a lack of this data in the private market and 
obtaining it from FEMA presents its own challenges.  
                    4.2.2.4.2 Base Premium with Simulated Catastrophe Adjustment 
It has also been suggested that standard property insurance ratemaking techniques 
with the addition of a premium adjustment for long-term catastrophic loss exposure based on 
expected losses from simulation tools (also known as “cat models”) would work well for 
flood insurance ratemaking. This rating procedure would easily apply to independent flood 
insurance products; simulated expected loss could also prove to be a useful addition in multi-
peril ratemaking for policies covering a variety of perils including flood. This technique 
lends itself well to ratemaking for flood risk due to the variety of flood risk that exists and its 
catastrophic nature. The base premium rate constructed by the insurer would reflect the 
sustained flood risk that a property faces: property that has never flooded before would have 
a low base rate while properties that flood regularly from typical rainfall would start with a 
higher base rate. This rate would then be adjusted based on the results from catastrophic 
scenario simulations. The simulations would account for the flood risk associated with higher 
intensity, lower frequency extreme weather events.  
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While this rating technique seems significantly more straightforward than multi-peril 
ratemaking, it is not without faults of its own. It is of limited usefulness to products other 
than standalone flood insurance; it is likely that flood insurance will be sold as an 
endorsement to or as a covered peril in more comprehensive property insurance coverages. 
Additionally, insurers face the difficulty of determining how to develop the base rate for a 
property. With no past claims data available to derive these rates from, insurers would have 
to construct their own process to evaluate base flood risk which takes time and could be 
costly. This is made even more difficult due to the previously discussed evolving nature of 
flood risk which insurers may need to account for in the development of a base rate. 
Furthermore, in order to employ the use of catastrophe models in flood ratemaking, the 
models have to first be produced as well as tested extensively. While these models exist for 
and are used in the ratemaking of other insured perils, the development of catastrophe models 
for flood risk has proved to be difficult. Catastrophe models in general as well as those 
specific to floods are discussed in more detail in section 4.2.3.1. 
                    4.2.2.4.3 Community Rating 
Insurers may also consider setting premiums for flood insurance based on a 
community rating system. They could copy the system that the NFIP uses where 
policyholders receive a discount in communities with strong floodplain management systems 
in place. However, unlike the NFIP, private insurers would be not be able to provide 
assistance to communities to put these techniques in place. Without assistance, many 
communities would remain unable to build the necessary infrastructure to manage flood risk 
and therefore would not be able to receive the community rated premium reduction resulting 
in flood coverage remaining unaffordable for a large portion of property owners. While this 
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type of community rating works well when an agency like FEMA is in place to support it, it 
would likely not transfer well to the private market.  
The private market could consider applying a community rating system similar to 
what is often used in health insurance to their flood insurance products. In a health insurance 
context, community rating refers to a rating system that requires all insureds in the same 
geographical area to pay the same premiums, regardless of their health status (Community 
Rating, n.d.). While community rating of a similar format is not currently used for any 
property insurance, it may be useful for flood rating. This would involve insurers evaluating 
the risk for each property in the community to establish an aggregate risk level. The premium 
for this aggregate risk would then be divided more evenly between all participants with less 
emphasis on their individual risk level: high-risk properties would pay slightly less than their 
risk-reflective rate while low-risk properties would pay slightly more. Community rating is 
beneficial in that it would ensure private flood insurance is still affordable for high-risk 
individuals.  
Although this rating system includes a type of policy subsidy, insurers will not face 
the same financial risk that the NFIP faces since they will be collecting adequate premiums 
overall (amounts that in aggregate cover the risk underwritten). It can be argued that a policy 
rated in this way would be difficult to sell as low-risk individuals do not want to subsidize 
the rates for high-risk individuals. It is true that individuals likely do not want to subsidize 
the rates for property owners on the other side of the country, however, they may be more 
inclined to subsidize the rates for their neighbors. After an intense flooding event, the 
resilience of a community is greatly impacted by the ability of individuals to rebuild. Lower-
risk property owners may be willing to subsidize a portion of their higher-risk neighbors’ 
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rates since they arguably benefit from the insurance, both before and after a loss occurs. A lot 
of this benefit comes in the form of mitigation funding and disaster relief from FEMA; 
communities that cooperate with FEMA are eligible for flood mitigation grants and disaster 
relief. Selling policies rated in this way will be difficult as low-risk property owners may 
have trouble seeing the benefit that they would be receiving.  
In order for community rating of flood insurance to work, adequate consumer 
participation is of utmost importance; this rating system may not be viable unless some 
variation of a mandatory purchase requirement is in place. Implementation of this rating 
system would prove difficult as insurers would be required to come up with ways to define or 
group communities for the rating process as well as develop the tools necessary to evaluate 
flood risk. It may also be too difficult for individual insurers to gain enough exposure in a 
singular community to implement this system, and even if they are able to, the risk they 
would be taking on would be poorly diversified. In order for this rating system to work, 
extensive collaboration, or even a pooling system, between private insurers is necessary, and 
with each insurer having their own risk evaluation techniques and individual risk appetite, 
this seems nearly impossible. While this system would solve the issue of private market flood 
policies being unaffordable for high-risk properties, its complexities would require the 
continuation of a governing body, such as the NFIP, to oversee private company 
collaboration.  
          4.2.3 Evaluating and Managing Catastrophic Risk  
The frequency and severity of flooding events easily classify it as a catastrophic risk. 
In order for the private market to be willing to offer flood insurance, they need to be able to 
ensure that their rates will result in a profitable product. This requires insurers have a 
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complete and detailed understanding of the risk they are taking on so that they are able to 
develop a rate that accurately reflects this risk in addition to having access to the financial 
instruments necessary to manage the risk. Since FEMA’s flood maps are not appropriate for 
use by the private market for this function, private insurers are faced with having to develop 
their own risk assessment tools. While the creation of applicable flood maps would assist 
insurers in risk evaluation, due to the complex nature of flood risk, it is universally accepted 
that the use of catastrophe models is necessary in order to produce and accurate assessment 
of flood risk. Catastrophe models are currently widely used by insurers for pricing, risk 
selection and underwriting, loss mitigation activities, reinsurance decision making and 
overall portfolio management for a variety of catastrophic perils (Clark, 2002). 
               4.2.3.1 Flood Catastrophe Models 
 Catastrophe models for flood risk are currently being developed by a variety of 
modeling companies, but they are not yet widely employed by private insurers for use in the 
ratemaking process. In general, catastrophe models work by combining mathematical 
representations of the natural occurrence patterns and characteristics of catastrophes and 
information on property values, construction types, and occupancy class to provide 
information to insurers about the potential for losses before they occur (Clark, 2002). 
Insurers use catastrophe modeling to anticipate the likelihood and severity of potential future 
events so that they can appropriately prepare for the financial impact. A basic example of a 
flood catastrophe model along with a discussion of applications can be found in Appendix D.  
In theory, catastrophe models should work well for evaluating flood risk since the 
lack of past data is a huge barrier to current flood rating; models are based on simulations 
created by analyzing the characteristics of past and potential events rather than fixating on 
33 
 
analysis of past loss history. A variety of companies have produced catastrophe models for 
flood and are marketing them to insurers, but none of these producers have come forth to 
provide data or examples of the accuracy of their models despite marketing claims of their 
credibility. Their hesitancy to discuss model specifics could be due to a desire to keep 
product information proprietary; however, it could also be due to a lack of relevant loss data 
to use for model validation purposes causing modelers to be unsure as to the accuracy of their 
product. The flood events over the last few years are helping insurers, reinsurers, and 
modeling companies to be able to validate their models against real losses which in 
conjunction with obtaining more comprehensive data will aid in improving model accuracy. 
Despite the complexity of flood risk, it is arguably more definable than hurricane and 
earthquake risk, and these are already being rated largely based on loss estimates from 
catastrophe models. Wind is a chaotic process; in a hurricane one house can be hit by strong 
gusts while the one beside it is spared. Flooding, on the other hand has a lower level of 
intrinsic variability because flood heights are relatively consistent from one patch of land to 
the next. The difficulty in developing flood models comes from not currently having the 
necessary data. There are three areas in which information is still needed in order to model 
flooding effectively: property elevation, existence of flood defenses, and information on what 
is happening below the ground floor (Is there a basement? What is it used for? Are expensive 
items stored there?) (Howard, 2019).  
 Many of the current producers of flood catastrophe models also offer other widely 
used catastrophe models as well: Milliman, AIR Worldwide, KatRisk, and Risk Management 
Solutions (RMS). As the demand for this product is still developing, there are many other 
companies vying for a spot as one of the first to develop the best flood model, including new 
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companies focused solely on modeling flood risk. Almost all of the models differentiate 
between fluvial and pluvial flooding events. Many have integrated flood with existing 
hurricane and storm surge models to give a more comprehensive view of tropical storm 
impacts while also providing a model specific to inland flooding. Each company’s product 
boasts unique features in simulation processes as well as output calculations as they try to 
stand out from their competitors. There are not currently any models that are seen as being 
better than the others since their accuracy is still under scrutiny and working to be improved. 
Industry professionals strongly believe that flooding is a definable peril and that the 
development of robust and accurate catastrophe models is inevitable (Howard, 2019). 
               4.2.3.2 Reinsurance 
 In addition to being able to evaluate the catastrophic nature of flood risk, private 
insurers need to ensure that there is an adequate appetite in the reinsurance market to assume 
a portion of the high severity risk that flood presents. The willingness of reinsurers to provide 
coverage to the NFIP in recent years is promising for the private market. If reinsurers are 
able to offer coverage to a program not focused on making a profit and riddled with adverse 
selection it can be assumed that they would be inclined to offer reinsurance for flood risk to 
private insurance companies as well.  
Capital markets have also become increasingly interested in participating in the 
insurance industry, which can be specifically seen through the ability of FEMA to administer 
a catastrophe bond in 2018. Even if private insurers are unable to acquire reinsurance, they 
also have these alternative risk financing techniques available to them through the capital 
market. Private insurers should not be worried about the ability to obtain the proper 
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instruments to help them manage high severity flood risk since alternative markets have 
already proven their interest and ability to assume this risk. 
          4.2.4 Adequate Consumer Participation 
 Many private insurers are concerned that there is not sufficient participation by 
consumers in the flood insurance market which is necessary for them to manage and 
diversify their risk exposure. Good risk assessment does not drive consumer behavior; even if 
insurers are able to create the necessary tools to accurately evaluate flood risk that doesn’t 
mean consumers will be willing to purchase their flood insurance products. Even with 
effective ratemaking, the problem of adverse selection, which led to the creation of the NFIP 
in the first place, will continue to exist and create a vicious cycle. If only high-risk 
individuals are buying flood coverage, then rates overall will increase. This in turn decreases 
the number of individuals who decide to purchase coverage to where only those with 
extremely high loss potential are purchasing coverage which then furthers the issue of 
adverse selection.  
The NFIP has always seen increasing the purchase of flood insurance policies as one 
of their objectives, and it was their motivation behind enacting the mandatory purchase 
requirement. Even with the mandatory purchase requirement in place, flood insurance 
participation rates have consistently remained low, although no official studies on 
compliance have been conducted since 2006 (Horn & Webel, 2018). Nationwide, the 
purchase rate in Special Flood Hazard Areas, the only areas where the mandatory purchase 
applies to a portion of the population, is only a little over 30%, and outside of SFHAs they 
are much lower (Kousky et al., 2018). However, as of February 2018, around 2 million 
households outside of mandatory purchase areas had voluntarily purchased coverage 
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(Kousky et al., 2018). Broad participation is necessary to limit adverse selection and maintain 
a sufficiently large and diverse risk pool, so many people believe that some form of a 
mandatory purchase requirement will likely remain in place. All proposed bills require a 
study to assess the compliance with the current mandatory purchase requirement (Horn & 
Webel, 2018).  
In order to overcome adverse selection and ensure adequate market penetration, the 
discussion around flood insurance needs to change. It is necessary to shift consumer 
perception so that flood insurance is no longer seen as an added, unnecessary expense, but as 
an essential product that could have a substantial impact on financial status and quality of life 
should a loss event occur. Achieving this would require educating consumers to establish a 
more robust understanding of the risk they inherently face, which for many property owners 
is likely significantly higher than currently recognized. Flood insurance needs to be seen as a 
standard property coverage rather than a specialized addition.  
     4.3 Benefits of Private Sector Involvement 
 The NFIP currently has very little variance in the types and limits of the coverages 
they offer compared to what is offered by the private market for similar insurance against 
non-flood perils. Private companies can compete by exceeding the limits of what the NFIP 
will cover through offerings such as business interruption insurance, living expenses while 
property is repaired, basement coverage, coverage for other structures on property, and 
higher coverage limits. Private companies could also include flood as part of a standard 
homeowners’ policy therefore eliminating the problem of distinguishing between wind and 
flood damage after intense storms. Private companies can also streamline the application 
process and shorten the NFIP’s current 30-day waiting period before coverage goes into 
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effect. All of these possibilities benefit consumers by giving them a wider variety of 
coverage options which allows them to purchase individualized coverage that better meets 
their needs. With greater market participation and competition, many consumers may be able 
to find coverage at rates lower than the cost of NFIP coverage. 
5 The Future of Flood Insurance 
 With the May 2019 reauthorization of the NFIP still pending and the expansion of 
private flood coverage beginning to take hold, the future of United States flood insurance is 
still widely uncertain. Most experts believe that the NFIP will continue to operate in some 
capacity although their role may continue to evolve over time. FEMA is currently working to 
strengthen the NFIP’s position as an insurance provider through acknowledging the financial 
shortcomings of the NFIP’s current insurance operations and actively working to revise many 
of the policies that contributed to the extensive accumulation of debt. While the NFIP will 
likely always act as an insurer to some extent through providing coverage to high risk 
properties the private market is unwilling to take on, FEMA may shift their focus as private 
insurers continue to grow their market share. 
 It is imperative that FEMA continue their support of floodplain management and risk 
mitigation even if no longer as a part of the NFIP. As the only entity to exist with this focus 
as a central function, the continuation of these efforts is critical to the resiliency of the United 
States. Private insurance providers are still faced with extensive obstacles they have to 
overcome in order to increase their market share of flood coverage, but they have made it 
apparent they are up for the challenge. It is unknown what the interaction between the public 
and private sectors will be as these changes continue to shape the future of the United States’ 
flood insurance market. 
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     5.1 Proposed Market Structure 
In the discussions around what the future of flood insurance might look like for the 
United States, a variety of models have been considered that outline alternative ways the 
private and public sectors may share flood risk exposure (Friedman, n.d.). Figure 7 outlines 
the estimated ease of implementation and degree of risk sharing for each model. 
 The Crop Insurance Model  
Private carriers write a certain level of coverage and reinsure catastrophic levels with the 
federal government. Additionally, more protection can be added and risk spread through 
reinsurers offering excess-of-loss coverage to cap the government’s aggregate exposure. The 
advantage to this is that federal funds are only required to cap the industry’s maximum loss 
in intense catastrophe years.  
 The Reinsurance Model  
This is similar to what currently exists. The NFIP spreads their risk by purchasing 
reinsurance from the private sector. This model can be structured in different ways with 
reinsurance taking on high-level losses, or middle-range losses (with the NFIP coming back 
in to cover high losses). With the Biggert-Waters Act already allowing the NFIP to secure 
reinsurance, the implementation of this model is relatively simple, and one of the biggest 
benefits is the flexibility of reinsurance program structures.  
 The Capital Market Model 
In addition to private primary and reinsurance, capital market avenues, such as catastrophe 
bonds, are used to further spread risk. The use of catastrophe bonds for spreading wind and 
earthquake exposures is well established, so continuing to expand this practice to flood risks 
should be relatively straightforward. 
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 The Pooling Model  
Set up a flood insurance pool, similar to that of the California Earthquake Authority (CEA), 
where participating insurers can sell flood coverage bundled with standard homeowners 
insurance. Insurers have the advantage of pooling their resources and paying out of that pool, 
therefore diversifying their risks. There are many skeptics of this concept as the CEA 
resilience has not been tested by an actual loss event. Additionally, there is potential for a 
low take-up rate given the cost of coverage for high-risk properties.  
The Partial Privatization Model 
Private markets pick up moderate flood risks while leaving the NFIP in place for those who 
cannot get coverage through the private market. This model has the potential to exacerbate 
the adverse selection issue that already exists in the NFIP and leave the program financially 
unstable even if actuarially fair prices are charged.  
The Bundling Model   
This is based on the United Kingdom flood insurance program structure. Flood insurance is 
included in standard homeowner’s policies and is a mandatory coverage. Additionally, the 
government is reducing flood exposures through infrastructure development. This would 
ensure everyone has coverage therefore removing the issue of adverse selection and insurers 
would have a large enough pool to diversify their exposure and keep premiums at an 
affordable rate. Homeowners who face minimal flood risk may be angry about the mandate 
to buy coverage they do not feel they need.   
 The ‘Opt-Out’ Model 
Requiring that all property owners are offered flood insurance along with their standard 
homeowners policy but being allowed to opt-out of that coverage. This could boost coverage 
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participation similar to how opt-out provisions boosted employee participation in 401(k) 
plans. Additionally, participation can be increased by having those who turned down 
coverage become ineligible for federal disaster assistance if an event occurs; there is wide 
skepticism if the government would be able to follow through on this pledge. 
The ‘Lend a Hand’ Model 
The federal government, or individual states, offer financial support to high-risk homeowners 
who cannot afford to pay risk-based rates for flood insurance or to help them mitigate flood 
exposure. Connecticut has already implemented such a policy with their Shoreline Resiliency 
Fund to provide low-interest rate to flood prone property owners to elevate their homes. 
 The ‘It Takes A Village’ Model 
Flood insurance sold on a community-rated basis, similar to group health insurance, where 
residents can pay a lower premium than if they bought individual coverage. By improving 
affordability, more homeowners in flood prone areas may purchase coverage, and local 
governments may be more motivated to implement flood mitigation efforts. This approach 
could be utilized by the NFIP or private carriers. The Homeowner Flood Insurance 
Affordability Act of 2014 required that FEMA study the feasibility of incorporating a 
community-rating option into the NFIP.  
These models are not mutually exclusive, and the future of flood insurance will likely 
be a combination of these proposed ideas. It is unlikely that the NFIP will disappear 
completely in the May 2019 renewal, and there is a high chance that the federal government 
will continue to be involved in the future of flood insurance, whatever that may be.  
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6 Conclusion  
 Flood insurance in the United States is changing. Private insurers have shown a clear 
intent to enter the market as alternative coverage providers. Even faced with many obstacles 
still to overcome, there’s no question that they will continue to increase their market share. 
The NFIP plays too vital a role in the management and mitigation of flood risk to ever cease 
operations, but as a result of increased private flood offerings NFIP policies and focuses are 
developing as well. However, even with all these changes to the market, one thing has 
remained the same: the vast degree of flood underinsurance throughout the United States.  
Whether offered through the NFIP or private companies, in order for flood insurance 
to be successful, the problem of underinsurance has to be addressed. Only an estimated 15% 
of homeowners in the U.S. carry flood insurance and of those many do not carry sufficient 
levels of coverage (Insurance Information Institute, 2018). Underinsurance directly leads to 
the problem of adverse selection and was a motivation behind the initial development of the 
NFIP.  
Figure 7 (Friedman, n.d.) 
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Currently property owners see themselves as either needing flood coverage or not. 
This perception was exacerbated by the implementation of the mandatory purchase 
requirement; a property either lies within a special flood hazard area and therefore needs the 
mandated coverage or is outside the SFHA and therefore risk is minimal, and no coverage is 
needed. This has led to the extensive underinsurance that currently exists as an estimated 3 
times as many properties lie within 1-in-100 year floodplains than is currently indicated by 
FIRM maps (Adriano, 2018). Property owners need to be made aware of the true level of risk 
they face; just because their property has never flooded before doesn’t mean it never will, 
especially with flood risk exposure continually evolving.  
The underinsurance of flood risk can have serious financial consequences. As the 
damage from storms continues to increase, proper insurance coverage is a crucial element in 
securing the ability of individual property owners as well as communities as a whole to 
rebuild. Widespread flood insurance is a necessity in order to ensure resilience as 
communities continue to be faced with extreme flooding events. In order for any progress to 
be made, the discussion around flood insurance has to change. 
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Appendix A: FIRM Maps and Flood Hazard Zones2 
 
Riverine Flood Hazard Zones 
 
 
Coastal Flood Hazard Zones 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 FEMA. (n.d.). General Design Considerations. In Making Critical Facilities Safe From Flooding. Retrieved May 1, 2019, 
from https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1557-20490-2194/fema543_chapter2.pdf 
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Appendix B: Companies and Subsidiaries Participating in National Flood Insurance 
Program Write-Your-Own Program as of March 20193 
 
1. Allstate Insurance Company 
a. Allstate New jersey Insurance 
Company 
2. American Capital Assurance Corporation 
3. American Commerce Insurance Company 
a. Citation Insurance Company  
b. Commerce Insurance Company 
c. Commerce West Insurance Company  
d. Mapfre Insurance Company  
e. Mapfre Insurance Company of New 
York 
4. American Family Mutual Insurance 
Company  
a. American Family Insurance Company 
5. American National Property and Casualty 
Company 
6. American Strategic Insurance Corporation 
a. ACA Home Insurance Corporation 
b. ASI Assurance Corporation 
c. ASI Lloyds 
d. ASI Preferred Insurance Corporation 
e. ASI Select Insurance Corporation 
7. American Traditions Insurance Company  
8. Assurant, DBA: American Bankers 
Insurance Company of Florida 
9. Auto Club South Insurance Company  
10. Auto-Owners Insurance Company  
a. Owners Insurance Company  
11. Baldwin Mutual Insurance Company  
12. Bankers Insurance Group, DBA: First 
Community Insurance Company  
a. Bankers Insurance Company  
b. Bankers Specialty Insurance Company  
13. Capitol Preferred Insurance Company  
14. Centauri Specialty Insurance Company 
15. Cooperativa de Seguros Multiples de Puerto 
Rico 
16. Cornerstone National Insurance Company  
17. CSAA Insurance Exchange 
a. ACA Insurance Company  
b. Western United Insurance Company  
18. Everett Cash Mutual Insurance Company  
19. Farm Family Casualty Insurance Company  
20. Farmers Insurance Group/DBA Fire 
Insurance Exchange 
                                                          
3 FEMA. (2019, January 30). Write Your Own Flood Insurance Company List. Retrieved May 1, 2019, from 
https://www.fema.gov/wyo_company 
a. Civic Property & Casualty Company  
b. Farmers Insurance Company  
c. Farmers Insurance Company of 
Arizona 
d. Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho 
e. Farmers Insurance Company of 
Oregon 
f. Farmers Insurance Company of 
Washington 
g. Farmers Insurance Exchange 
h. Farmers Insurance of Columbus 
i. Farmers New Century Insurance 
Company  
j. Foremost Insurance Company of 
Grand Rapids 
k. Michigan Illinois Farmers Insurance 
Company  
l. Mid-Century Insurance Company  
m. Texas Farmers Insurance Company 
n. Truck Insurance Exchange 
21. FedNat Insurance Company  
22. First American Property & Casualty 
Insurance Company  
23. First Insurance Company of Hawaii 
24. First Protective Insurance Company  
25. Florida Family Insurance Company  
26. Gulfstream Property and Casualty Insurance 
Company  
27. Hartford Fire Insurance Company  
a. Hartford Fire Insurance Company of 
the Midwest 
28. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company  
29. Homesite Insurance Company  
a. Homesite Indemnity Company  
b. Homesite Insurance Company of 
California 
c. Homesite Insurance Company of 
Florida 
d. Homesite Insurance Company of 
Georgia 
e. Homesite Insurance Company of 
Illinois 
f. Homesite Insurance Company of New 
York 
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g. Homesite Insurance Company of the 
Midwest 
h. Homesite Lloyd’s of Texas 
30. Integrand Assurance Company  
31. Island Insurance Company 
32. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company 
33. Mapfre PRAICO Insurance Company  
34. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance 
Company  
a. Metropolitan Direct Property & 
Casualty Insurance Company  
35. Multinational Insurance Company  
36. National General Insurance Company  
a. Imperial Fire & Casualty Insurance 
Company  
b. Integon Casualty Insurance Company  
c. Integon General Insurance Company  
d. Integon Indemnity Corporation 
e. Integon National Insurance Company 
f. Integon Preferred Insurance Company  
g. MIC General Insurance Corporation  
h. National General Assurance Company  
i. National General Insurance Company  
j. National General Insurance Online, 
Inc.  
k. New South Insurance Company  
37. NGM Insurance Company  
a. Main Street America Assurance 
Company  
b. Old Dominion Insurance Company  
38. Occidental Fire & Casualty Company of 
North Carolina 
39. Pacific Indemnity Insurance Company  
40. Philadelphia Contributionship Insurance 
Company  
a. Germantown Insurance Company  
41. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company  
42. Pilgrim Insurance Company  
a. High Point Preferred Insurance 
Company  
b. Mount Washington Assurance 
Corporation 
c. Palisades Property & Casualty 
Insurance Company  
d. Plymouth Rock Assurance 
Corporation 
43. Prepared Insurance Company  
44. Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange 
45. QBE Insurance Corporation 
46. Safepoint Insurance Company  
47. Selective Insurance Company of America 
a. Selective Casualty Insurance 
Company  
b. Selective Fire & Casualty Insurance 
Company  
c. Selective Insurance Company of New 
England 
d. Selective Insurance Company of New 
York 
e. Selective Insurance Company of South 
Carolina 
f. Selective Insurance Company of the 
Southeast 
48. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance 
Company  
a. Florida Farm Bureau General 
Insurance Company  
b. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual 
Insurance Company  
c. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual 
Insurance Company  
d. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty 
Insurance Company  
e. Mississippi Farm Bureau Mutual 
Insurance Company  
f. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual 
Insurance Company  
g. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual 
Insurance Company  
h. Virginia Farm Bureau Mutual 
Insurance Company  
49. Southern Fidelity Insurance Company  
50. Union Mutual Fire Insurance Company  
51. United Property & Casualty Insurance 
Company  
52. United Surety & Indemnity Company  
53. Universal Insurance Company (PR) 
54. Universal Insurance Company of North 
America 
55. Universal North America Insurance 
Company  
56. USAA General Indemnity Company  
57. Westfield Insurance Company  
58. White Pine Insurance Company  
59. Windsor-Mount Joy Mutual Insurance 
Company  
60. Wright National Flood Insurance Company 
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Appendix C: Companies Participating in NFIP Reinsurance4 
 
2019 
Allied World Insurance Company  
Antares (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 1274 AUL) 
Apollo (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 1969 APL) 
Ariel Re (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 1910 ARE) 
Ascot (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 1414 ASC) 
AXIS Reinsurance Co 
Brit (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 2987 BRT) 
Canopius (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 4444 CNP) 
Chaucer (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 1084 CSL) 
Faraday (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 0435 FDY) 
Hannover Ruck SE 
Hiscox (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 0033 HIS) 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company  
Liberty Specialty Services Ltd. Paris o/b/o 
(Lloyd’s Synd. No. 4472 LIB) 
Markel Global Reinsurance Co 
MS Amlin (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 2001 
AML) 
Munich Reinsurance America, Inc.  
Navigators US 
Renaissance (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 1458 
RNR) 
Renaissance Reinsurance U.S. Inc.  
SCOR Reinsurance Company  
Swiss Reinsurance America Corporation 
The Cincinnati Insurance Co 
Transatlantic Re o/b/o General 
Reinsurance Corporation 
Transatlantic Reinsurance Company  
Validus Americas o/b/o Validus 
Reinsurance (Switzerland) Ltd.  
XL Catlin (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 2003 XLC) 
XL Reinsurance America, Inc.
 
2018 
Allied World Insurance Company  
Amlin (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 2001 AML) 
Apollo (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 1969 APL) 
Ariel (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 1910 ARE) 
Ascot (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 1414 ASC) 
AXIS Reinsurance Co US 
Brit (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 2987 BRT) 
Canopius (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 4444 CNP) 
Chaucer (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 1084 CSL) 
Faraday (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 0435 FDY) 
General Reinsurance Corporation 
Hannover Ruck SE 
Hiscox (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 0033 HIS) 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company  
                                                          
4 FEMA. (2019, April 24). National Flood Insurance Program’s (NFIP) Reinsurance Program. Retrieved May 1, 2019, from 
https://www.fema.gov/nfip-reinsurance-program 
Liberty Specialty Services Ltd. Paris o/b/o 
(Lloyd’s Synd. No. 4472 LIB) 
Managing Agency Partners (Lloyd’s Synd. 
No. 2791 MAP) 
Markel Global Reins Co 
Munich Reinsurance America, Inc.  
QBE Reinsurance Corporation 
Renaissance (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 1458 
RNR) 
Renaissance Reinsurance U.S. Inc.  
SCOR Reinsurance Company  
Swiss Re Underwriters Agency, Inc. o/b/o 
Swiss Reinsurance America 
Corporation 
The Cincinnati Insurance Co 
5 
 
Transatlantic Reinsurance Company  
Validus Reinsurance (Switzerland) Ltd.  
XL Catlin (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 2003 XLC) 
XL Reinsurance America, Inc.
 
2017
Amlin (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 2001) 
Ascot (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 1414) 
Axis Reinsurance Company U.S.  
Brit (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 2987) 
Everest Reinsurance Company 
Faraday (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 0435)  
General Reinsurance Company  
Hannover Ruck SE 
Hiscox (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 0033) 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company 
Liberty Specialty Markets (Lloyd’s Synd. 
No. 4472)  
Market Global Reinsurance Company  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Munich Reinsurance America Inc.  
National Indemnity (U.S.) 
Partner Reinsurance Company of the U.S.  
QBE Reinsurance Corporation  
Renaissance Re (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 1458) 
Renaissance Reinsurance U.S. Inc.  
SCOR Reinsurance Company  
Sompo Canopius (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 4444) 
Swiss Reinsurance America Corporation 
Transatlantic Reinsurance Company  
Validus Reinsurance (Switzerland) Ltd. 
XL Catlin (Lloyd’s Synd. No. 2003) 
XL Reinsurance America Inc. 
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Appendix D: A Simple Excel Based Catastrophe Model and its Applications 
 
When broken down to the most basic level, catastrophe models contain four main 
components: the probability of an event, intensity/effect of an event, property values, and 
insured losses. I was able to utilize VBA code and the macro function in Excel to create a 
simplified catastrophe model. In order to illustrate how an insurer may utilize the results 
from a catastrophe model, I then took my simulated results and applied them to the 
calculation of premiums under a community rating as well as a risk-based rating system. This 
appendix details the development of the sample catastrophe model, including how basic 
assumptions were developed, as well as the application of results to the aforementioned 
rating systems.  
It is important to note that although flooding events are spread out over many years 
and the actual cost of them to insurers would therefore be impacted by the time value of 
money, this factor was left out of the model. This was intentional due to the high variation in 
interest rates and home values over time as well as for simplicity's sake.  
 
Set-Up 
 The first step of model development was to set up the excel sheet that will be 
populated with input assumptions and simulated results. The image below shows the section 
of the worksheet where the modeler’s assumptions are input; all cells highlighted in blue can 
be changed and are used for calculations within the simulation. The user assumptions for all 
of these inputs should be entered before running the simulation. The first four inputs that the 
simulation user should consider are: 
Coverage Limit, the amount of coverage available for purchase; 
Cost per Inch, the average damage to a home caused by one inch of floodwater; 
Homes, the number of homes theoretically in the insurers portfolio in this area or the 
number of homes to be simulated for each flooding event; and  
Years, the number of years for which potential events will be simulated.  
Here, coverage limit is set to reflect the NFIP maximum coverage for a single-family home, 
and cost per inch is set to the average found during research, while homes and years are up to 
the discretion of the user and may vary based upon why they are employing the simulation. 
The motivation for all other assumption inputs selected below will be explained as they are 
referenced throughout the simulation. 
 
 
The fields illustrated to the left create the space for 
the simulation to input the number of flooding events 
that happen each year. The year column is populated 
to reflect the number of years chosen as an input 
above starting with 1 input into cell A11 and using 
the formula “=IF(A11<$B$6,A11+1,"")” to populate 
the remainder of the column.  
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The other two fields 
illustrated here create the 
space for the simulation to 
input the modeled results 
for each home in each 
flooding event as well as 
calculated totals and 
averages for each event.  
 
Simulation 
The first line of VBA code that begins the simulation 
names it appropriately “Simulation.” The following 3 
lines clear the cells where results will be input so that 
any results from previous simulation runs are removed.  
 
The first thing that the simulation calculates is the number of flooding events that occur each 
year. This is done using a Poisson distribution; this distribution works well as it expresses the 
probability of a given number of events occurring within a specified timeframe given that 
events are independent of one another when the approximate rate of occurrence is known. 
The simulation user inputs their assumption of the frequency of flooding events into the 
Poisson Mean input cell. In this example, we are assuming a 1-in-50 year floodplain; 
therefore, our input for Poisson mean is the number of flooding events we expect to have 
each year, which in this case is 
1/50, or 0.02. When the user inputs 
this assumption it automatically 
updates the “Poisson” worksheet 
(illustrated to the left) to reflect this 
mean. The table in this worksheet 
calculates the probability 
distribution function (PDF) as well 
as cumulative distribution function 
(CDF) for values reflecting the 
number of flooding events that 
occur each year.  
 
When the simulation is run, it first determines the number of years to simulate based on the 
user input for Years. Then for each of these years it simulates a random value between 0 and 
1 reflecting the CDF of the number of flooding events that occur within that year. The 
corresponding number of events is then read from the “Poisson” worksheet and input into the 
corresponding cell within column B of the worksheet. The VBA code that executes is 
provided below.
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After the number of flooding events for each year is simulated, the total number of events 
that occurred over all years is calculated in cell B7 with the formula 
“=SUM(B11:B1048576)”. This total number of events along with the number of homes per 
event that the user wishes to simulate and input into the Homes input cell are then read into 
the simulation. 
 
 
 
 
The simulation then begins to calculate 
values for the first home in the first 
flooding event and starts by labeling the 
row with the appropriate event and home 
number within the section of the worksheet 
designated for displaying the simulation 
results.  
 
The first value that the simulation 
calculates for each home is its 
distance from the water source that is 
serving as the source of flooding. 
These distances are modeled as 
following a normal distribution with 
a mean and standard deviation that are defined by the user in the inputs. For this example, I 
examined these values for a beach in North Carolina and chose to use an average distance of 
750 ft from the coast, with a standard deviation of 150 ft. The simulation produces a random 
value between 0 and 1 to serve as the CDF of the distribution. The distance from the coast is 
then calculated using this CDF value and the inputs for distribution mean and standard 
deviation.  
 
The next attribute that is calculated 
for each home is the home value, 
which is based on the previously 
calculated distance. The reasoning 
behind basing value on distance is 
that the value of homes on the 
coast is typically higher than for 
those near the coast. In the 
development of this section I used 
Zillow to look at the values of 
homes in Topsail Beach, North Carolina. It was found that 750 ft from the coast served as a 
good cutoff for where the average home value began to change. Zillow was also used to find 
the average and standard deviation of home values for both homes that were less than 750 
feet from the coast as well as those that were further than 750 feet. It was found that homes 
within 750 ft of the coast had an average value of $400,000 and a standard deviation of 
$45,000 while those further out had a mean of $200,000 and standard deviation of $40,000.  
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The simulation first simulates a random value between 0 to 1 to represent the CDF of the 
distribution and then employs the use of ‘If Then’ functions to calculate the home value 
using the appropriate mean and standard deviation determined by the home’s distance.  
 
The model also includes the consideration 
that some homes along the coast have been 
elevated to decrease their chance of 
flooding. The simulation of this is based on 
a binomial distribution (as a home is either 
elevated or not), and the simulation user 
inputs what they believe to be the mean 
percentage of homes elevated in the area 
they are analyzing. Through looking at photographs of the North Carolina coast it was 
determined that around 15% of homes are elevated, so that was the assumption used in this 
example. The simulation produces a random number between 0 and 1, and if the value is 
below the average it is labeled as elevated (and if above the average labeled as not elevated).  
 
The simulation then calculates 
the height of flood water within 
the home based on whether or 
not the home is elevated as well 
as the distance of the home 
from the coast. It is assumed 
that if the home is elevated it is 
high enough that it does not 
flood. For homes that are not 
elevated, the depth of flood 
water is modeled as an 
exponential distribution with a 
mean based upon the homes 
distance from the coast. 
Varying mean by distance accounts for higher flood waters in homes closer to the coast while 
the use of an exponential distribution accounts for variations in land elevation and home 
foundation characteristics. Research found that for homes 100 ft or less from the coast, flood 
heights averaged 14.56 inches, for those greater than 100 ft but less than or equal to 500 ft 
heights averaged 8.83 ft, for those greater than 500 ft but less than or equal to 1000 ft heights 
averages 4.12 inches, and for those greater than 1000 ft flood height averaged 1.96 in. 
Additionally, a multiplier is added to these inputs which could be used to simulate the effect 
of variations in storm impact due to climate change, or land development changes. This is not 
something that this example will be exploring so the multiplier was set to 1. The model 
simulates a random number from 0 to 1, which again is used as the CDF in calculating the 
flood depth within the home from an exponential distribution with the correct mean 
corresponding to the home’s distance from the coast.  
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The model then calculates the damage 
to the home and resulting claim amount 
based on the depth of flood water as 
well as the home value. The cost of 
damage is found by taking the flood 
depth and multiplying by the input for 
cost per inch. However, as damage to a 
home cannot be more than the home’s 
value, the home value was set as a 
maximum for the damage calculation. 
The claim amount is then found by 
determining if the damage to the home 
is above or below policy limit; if damage is below the limit then the claim amount is equal to 
damage, but if it is above, then the claim amount is equal to the policy limit.  
 
The simulation then repeats calculations for distance, value, if elevated, flood depth, damage, 
and claim for the number of specified homes. After the values for each home have been 
calculated, the model calculates the average distance, average value, average depth, total 
damage, average damage, total claim, and average claim for the event by using all the homes 
for that event. The model then moves on to the next event and again simulates all the data for 
the number of homes specified and produces the summary data at the end. After all the 
homes for all of the events have been simulated, the model produces the same summary 
statistics for all homes across all events. 
 
 
The resulting data can then be used by insurers in various ways. They could run multiple 
simulations while varying one of the inputs to examine the sensitivity of the model to 
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different inputs. They could compare the results of insuring homes in one geographic 
location to another by changing multiple inputs to reflect the differences between locations. 
They could also use the modeled results to aid them in determining appropriate rates to 
charge customers, which is an idea that we will explore further here.  
 
Application to Rating 
 The results of this example simulation can be used to develop rates that an insurer 
may charge a customer. Specifically, I looked at a simplified example of a community rating 
system compared to a risk based premium rating system.  
 In this simplified community rating system, it is assumed that all homes will be 
charged the same premium regardless of their risk exposure which results in low-risk homes 
subsidizing a portion of the premium for higher risk homes. (This is more simplified than a 
standard community rating model where risk exposure is considered to some extent.) The 
amount that would be charged to each homeowner in our simplified system would be the 
average claim amount * the probability of incurring a claim (number of events/500 years).  
For example, if the simulation is run and over the 500 years 5 flood events occur that result 
in an average claim amount of $55,077.35, the insurer may charge all 10 homeowners an 
annual premium of (5/500)*$55,077.35 = $550.77 
However, the insurer would likely run the simulation multiple times to improve the 
accuracy of expected losses and compare multiple 500-year scenarios and the resulting 
premiums. The simulation was set at the baseline assumptions previously discussed in the 
appendix, run 8 times, and the results from each run were tracked in the following table: 
 
Simulation # of Events Average Claim Annual Premium Monthly Premium 
1 14 $61,308.26 $1,716.63 $143.05 
2 16 $68,755.67 $2,200.18 $183.35 
3 13 $71,120.73 $1,849.14 $154.09 
4 8 $69,736.69 $1,115.79 $92.98 
5 20 $57,960.06 $2,318.40 $193.20 
6 11 $78,606.90 $1,729.35 $144.11 
7 8 $74,472.06 $1,191.55 $99.30 
8 10 $66,045.44 $1,320.91 $110.08 
Average 12.5 $68,500.73 $1,680.24 $140.02 
 
Based on these results, the insurer may choose to charge each of the 10 homeowners in this 
area an annual premium of $1680.24 (monthly premium of $140.02). 
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 The simulation could also be used to develop risk-based premiums for homes in this 
area. Rating in this way would first require the development of loss relativities. The first step 
is creating categories that each of the simulated homes would fit. I chose to divide the homes 
based on 1) whether they are elevated and 2) their distance from the coast divided into the 
same categories that created the divisions for the changing flood depth mean: less than 100, 
between 100 and 500, between 500 and 1000, and greater than 1000. One of these categories 
must be chosen as the baseline, I chose a distance of 500<x<=1000 feet and not elevated as 
the baseline for this example as that is a common category in reality for coastal homes. Then 
the average claim for each of these categories was calculated, followed by the loss relativity, 
which is the average claim for each category divided by the average claim for the baseline 
category. These results for an example simulation can be seen below.  
 
 
The baseline premium is then calculated by taking the average claim for our baseline 
category and multiplying by the probability of a loss occurrence (simulated # of events/500 
years). In this example our baseline premium is $1,595.28. To determine the annual 
premiums for the other categories, their loss representatives are multiplied by the baseline 
premium resulting in the following rates: 
 
In order to determine the premium actually charged, a modeler would likely repeat this 
process multiple times and use an average of the rates to determine what will be charged. 
  
 We see that the premium charged to the baseline group in the risk-based pricing is 
similar to the premium charged to everyone in community-based rating system. The 
difference is that in the risk-based system, homes that are further from the coast are charged a 
slightly lower premium while those that are closer to the coast are charged significantly 
more. The community rating system makes premiums significantly more affordable for high 
risk properties; however, lower risk homeowners may be unwilling to pay the higher price 
needed to subsidize the premiums of these high-risk properties. Alternatively, under the risk-
based rating system, high-risk property owners may be unable to afford coverage at all.  
It is important also to note the premiums calculated in both the community rating and 
risk-based rating examples are gross premiums that do not represent the inclusion of insurer 
expenses and profits; thus, the actual rate that insurers would charge would be higher than 
this. 
